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Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law
Steve Coughlan*
Common law police powers have long been a source of some dispute in the
Canadian criminal justice system. On the one hand, their existence is difficult to
reconcile with predictability in the law, since in any individual case where a new
power is created (generally referred to as use of the "ancillary powers doctrine"), it would not have been possible to know in advance that the police were
actually acting legally. On the other hand the benefit for society purchased with
that ambiguity is a more tailored response to the particular problem, which
might also lead to better results in future cases. One can reasonably fall into a
variety of places on the scale defined by the values of predictability and protection of society.
Recently, however, two trends can be observed in the use of common law police
powers. Where at one point they were a rarity, and perhaps only served as a
safety valve, more frequently today courts seems to regard the use of the ancillary powers doctrine as one of the tools always brought to the table. That trend
reflects a movement toward the tailoring end and away from the predictability
end of the spectrum.
The second trend is more worrying. This trend reflects not merely a greater willingness to tailor the law for particular fact patterns, but a change in exactly what
it means for the police to have a common law police power. In essence, the
Supreme Court seems to have begun to interpret the ancillary powers doctrine in
a way which ceases to think of the police as having actual "powers" at all, but
rather as whether we should retroactively approve or disapprove of the decision
made on the spot by the individual officer. If a court approves, the power existed: if a court did not approve, the power did not exist. Ultimately that approach would challenge foundational notions of our criminal justice system, because it will amount to rule by people, not by law.
It is not clear that the Court has wholeheartedly adopted this approach. However, its most recent decision on common law police powers, R. v. Clayton (reported ante) is worrying in this regard. It would be difficult to disagree with the
Court's conclusion there that the facts of the case do not lead to a Charter remedy. Upon receiving a reliable tip that men with handguns were in a parking lot,
the police within minutes established a roadblock to check cars leaving that
parking lot. The general public would surely be dismayed if it were found that
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on receiving a reliable tip of this sort the police would not be entitled to act on it
in this fairly limited way. But though that ultimate conclusion seems like the
right one, with respect it must be said that the minority judgment's approach to
reaching that result is far preferable to that of the majority.
The Court has frequently pointed to the fact that Canada is governed by the rule
of law, which embraces three principles: that the law is supreme over government as well as private individuals, thereby precluding arbitrary power, that
there must be an actual order of positive laws, and that the relationship between
the individual and the state is regulated by that order of positive laws.' In particular the doctrine of vagueness "is founded on the rule of law, particularly on the
principles of fair notice to citizens and limitation of enforcement discretion".2
Criminal law is meant to be "fixed, pre-determined and accessible and understandable by the public",3 and "no room for arbitrary government action should
exist under that law".4 In particular, the Court has held that:
.. .if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.5

Judged against these criteria, one must question whether the majority's approach
sufficiently complies with the standards which the Court has itself set out in
previous cases.
Common law police powers in and of themselves have always presented some
tension with the concept of the rule of law. Since the ancillary powers doctrine
almost necessarily amounts to first confirming the existence of a police power
after it has been exercised in circumstances where an accused might have reasonably have thought no police power existed, it is difficult to reconcile with the
law being knowable in advance. However, as the minority judgement points out,
although Canada is out of step with many other countries in this regard, the
ancillary powers doctrine is well-entrenched here. Its use here is simply evi-
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dence of the first trend around ancillary powers, the greater willingness to use
the doctrine.
But, at least as it has been used until recently, the ancillary powers doctrine has
only created a kind of "one-off discontinuity from the knowability of the law.
Vincent Godoy might not have been able to know that he could not refuse the
officers entry to his apartment, but since R. v. Godoy everyone else has known
that police have the authority to enter premises to investigate a disconnected 911
call.6 Though their genesis might be different, common law police powers are,
at least after the fact, part of the order of positive laws contributing to the rule of
law.
That would equally be true of the use of the common law power suggested by
the minority judges here. The five part test formulated by Justice Binnie would
quite clearly define a new rule. It does not, as the minority notes, provide a great
deal of guidance for other situations, because that is not its purpose: rather, it
provides guidance on this situation.
However, the majority judgement in this case uses the Waterfield test7 to do
more than simply create a new police power. Actually, they also use it to do less
than create a new police power, which is how their reasoning demonstrates the
second trend in the use of the ancillary powers doctrine.
The majority does less than create a new power, because to a very large extent
individuals, police and judges are left in just as much doubt after this decision as
they were beforehand as to what powers police have. The majority offers nothing like the guidance that the minority provides. Rather, in the majority's view,
the detention was "reasonably necessary" in the "totality of circumstances"
(para. 41), and therefore the police had the necessary power. When else will they
have a similar power to detain? Seemingly whenever else that is reasonably necessary in the totality of circumstances — which for police and individuals
amounts to little more guidance than "guess". This rule essentially says "there is
a police power to detain in circumstances where the police ought to be able to
detain". There is no relatively clear new rule to become part of the "order of
positive laws".
One could suggest that an advantage of the majority's approach is its flexibility.
Where the minority's rule only settles future situations quite similar to that here,
the majority approach allows the police to have the powers they need in a much
wider variety of unanticipated cases. That approach, one might claim, serves
society's interests better. However, the benefit of the arrest provisions or search
warrant provisions in the Criminal Code is not that they give the police arrest or
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search powers in every circumstance where after the fact we might approve of
that result. Rather, the benefit of those provisions is that they allow all of us to
say with reasonable certainty that the police do or don't have a particular power
in particular situations. That is what the rule of law is: not that the police have
every power, but that we know the range of powers that they have. The "flexibility" of the majority's approach is exactly what undermines this goal.
Further, a central purpose of the rule of law is to prevent arbitrary government
action and enforcement of laws on a subjective basis. In providing too little guidance to police and individuals, the "reasonably necessary" test invites subjective application. One could claim that the rule of law is still protected by later
review of those "on-the-street" decisions in court, where they are approved or
disapproved as violating the Charter or not. To a certain extent this is correct,
but as the Court noted in Hunter v. Southam Inc.* the real goal should be to stop
Charter violations before they occur, not to provide remedies for them afterward. The more that the limits of a police power are left to be determined after
the fact, the more we depart from this fundamental principle.
The majority also uses the ancillary powers doctrine to do more than create a
new police power. As Justice Binnie notes, the "reasonably necessary" analysis
used by the majority also becomes their Charter analysis of the s. 8 and s. 9
claims: in effect, since it was reasonably necessary for the police to do what they
did, there was no Charter violation.
This objection carries on a point first noted by Justices LeBel and Fish (the other
two members of the minority here) in Orbanski.9 There, they objected to the
majority finding a limit on rights to be prescribed by law for s. 1 purposes on the
basis that, although not explicitly stated, the power in question was needed as
part of the "operational requirements" of the statute in question. They objected:
80 In the absence of a statutory basis, the operational requirement argument
seems to relate more to the justification for a limit than to the existence of
the limit. This argument appears to flow from the premise that a particular
limitation on constitutional rights is necessary. Because it is necessary, the
courts will then create it. At the last stage of this process, these same courts
will determine whether the limit they have placed on constitutional rights can
be justified under s. 1 of the Charter on the basis of the same necessity
which was used to justify the creation of the limit. Circularity is the hallmark
of this chain of reasoning, which appears to conflate the process of creating
the common law rule with the process of justifying i t . . .
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81 The adoption of a rule limiting Charter rights on the basis of what
amounts to a utilitarian argument in favour of meeting the needs of police
investigations through the development of common law police powers would
tend to give a potentially uncontrollable scope to the doctrine developed in
the Waterfield-Dedman line of cases, which — and we sometimes forget
such details — the court that created it took care not to apply on the facts
before it (R. v. Waterfielcl, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (C.C.A.)). The doctrine
would now be encapsulated in the principle that what the police need, the
police get, by judicial fiat if all else fails or if the legislature finds the adoption of legislation to be unnecessary or unwarranted. The courts would limit
Charter rights to the full extent necessary to achieve the purpose of meeting
the needs of the police.. .

The majority approach in Clayton seems to show this prediction coming true.
The criminal justice system is not required to be utterly uncompromising: flexibility can exist in legal tests and in legal powers, whether created by statute or
common law. The rule of law requires neither stagnation nor complete rigidity.
However, it does require that there actually be rules. At a certain point rules
become so pliable that they cease really to have that status in anything but name.
At that point we would not have the rule of law, but the rule of people. We must
be careful not to accidentally arrive at that point through continuing use of —
and expansion of the meaning o f — t h e ancillary powers doctrine.

